Abstract. Proof animation is a way of executing proofs to nd errors in the formalization of proofs. It is intended to be \testing in proof engineering". Although the realizability i n terpretation as well as the functional interpretation based on limit-computations were introduced as means for proof animation, they were unrealistic as an architectural basis for actual proof animation tools. We h a ve found game theoretical semantics corresponding to these interpretations, which is likely to be the right architectural basis for proof animation.
1 Introduction -proof animation-
In this paper, we will discuss a possible application of game theoretic semantics to proof animation. Proof animation is an application of an extended CurryHoward isomorphism. The notion of \proofs as programs" reads \if a program is extracted from a checked proof, then it does not have bugs." Proof animation is its contrapositive, \if a program extracted from a proof has a bug, then the proof is not correct." The objects of proof animation are not correct programs but formalized proofs.
By the late 80's, many people had still believed that formally veri ed programs would not have bugs. But, this has been proved wrong. Now, many s o f tware engineers have realized bugs in the formalization are far more serious than the bugs in the implementation. You cannot formally prove that your formal speci cations correctly re ect your informal intentions or requirements in your mind. It was believed that building a system according to detailed speci cations is more di cult than writing such a speci cation according to informal intentions or requirements. Probably, t h i s w as the right attitude at the time. However, the time has past and the environments for software engineering have c hanged. Thanks to excellent tools and software engineering technologies, such as design patterns, building systems correct to speci cations has become much easier than before. In the changeable modern business environments, speci cations tend to be changed even in the middle of a project. Requirement analysis, compliance test and validation are thus becoming more di cult and important i n s o f t ware development processes than veri cation. ? Partly supported by Monbushyo Kakenhi grant 1005-16650028. The address will change soon. Consult Web page for the new address.
The same will happen in formal proof developments. Although the proof checkers and methodologies to use them are not powerful enough for everyday usages in software developments, they are becoming ever more and more realistic. When formal veri cation technologies become a reality technology, the last problem left would be \how t o s h o w correctness of formalization."
Let us illustrate this problem by an example used in 9] . Assume that we are developing a formal theory of a metric jjxjj on the interval m n] o f t h e s e t of integers by the distance from n. For example, jjnjj is 0 and jjmjj is n ; m.
A linear order is de ned by means of the metric so that x is smaller than y i jjxjj < jjyjj, i.e., x is closer to n than y. W e wish to prove a minimum number principle for the ordering:
9x:8y:P m n (f(x) f (y))
where f is any function from the natural numbers to the interval and P m n (x y) represent \ x is less than or equals to y in the ordering". It maintains that there is some x such that f(x) is the minimum among f(0) f (1) : : : , namely, a minimum number principle for the ordering P m n .
The metric of x 2 m n] is formally de ned by n ; x. Thus, the formal de nition of P m n (x y) should be n ;y n ;x. Suppose that our proof language has the built-in predicate for but not for . T h us the -sign was used instead of -sign. However, it is a confusing usage of the inequality. It is plausible that we t ype n ;x n ; y by a slip of ngers in the de nition of P m n (x y). Suppose this happened. Then, the order is de ned by its reverse. Can we nd this error by developing the fully formalized proof of the minimum number principle for the ordering P m n ?
The answer is no. We can develop a formal proof of the principle with the wrong de nition of P m n (x y) g i v en above. This is because the ordering is isomorphic to its reverse. Formal proofs do not help us to nd the error, since the wrong de nition does not imply any contradictions. Only one thing is wrong with it, that is, the de nition is not the one which we intended in our mind. Since the intention is in our mind, there is no formal way to compare it with the formal de nition.
In the case of program developments, we can check our system against our intention by executing it. If the system is correct w.r.t. a speci cation, then we c a n c heck speci cations against our intention through validating the system. This kind of activities are called validation 16] . Veri cation is to ask \Did we build the system right?". Validation is to ask \Did we build the right system?". We m a y build a wrong system which i s right relative to wrong speci cations.
Can we do validation in formal proof developments? In the example given above, if our proof checker is smart enough to evaluate truth values of simple formulas, we can check if a de nition is correctly formulated. We expect P 2 7 (6 3) holds, but the proof checker would return false by e v aluating 7 ; 6 7 ; 3.
When we can execute formalized notions, we can validate them. Quite often, speci cations of realistic softwares are interactively executable by simulators, which are sometimes called animators. Thus, executing speci cations by such tools are sometimes called speci cation animation. Using this terminology, t h e evaluation of P 2 7 (6 3) with the result false may be called \de nition animation."
Although a large part of mathematics is non-executable, constructive mathematics is known to be executable by means of Curry-Howard isomorphism. This means that constructive mathematics can be animated. For example, the animation for P 2 7 (6 3) above, may be regarded as an execution of a constructive proposition 8x y:(P 2 7 (x y)_ : P 2 7 (x y)). Then, the animation of de nition turns to be an animation of the proof. The activity of animating proofs to validate them is called proof animation.
Limit interpretations
Constructive mathematics can be animated and validated through their executions (see 8]). However, a large part of mathematics is non-constructive. Classical proofs have been known to be executable by some constructive interpretations, such as continuation. However, they are known locally legible but not globally legible. W e can understand how e a c h classical rule is executed. We call this property local legibility. However, when the interpretations are applied to actual mathematical proofs, even for the simplest proofs such as the proof of the minimum number principle, the resulting algorithms are too complicated to understand. We can understand their behaviors in only a few exceptional cases with non-trivial e orts. We call this di culty global ilegibility. 1 . If proof animation is for nding useful information such as bounds for solutions and algorithms in classical proofs as proof mining in 14], global ilegibility is not a real obstacle. However, our aim is to test proofs to our intentions just as engineers test systems. Proof executions must be light and legible as test runs of programs. Thus, the global ilegibility is an essential defect for proof animations.
In 7, 15], we introduced a new realizability i n terpretation to overcome the global ilegibility. The de nition of our new realizability i n terpretation of logical connectives is the same as the original one by Kleene. However, the recursive realizers are replaced with the 0 2 -partial functions. Since the 0 2 -partial functions satisfy an axiom system of abstract recursion theory, e v erything goes just as in the case of the original realizability i n terpretation 15].
According to such a realizability interpretation, some semi-classical principles are valid, e.g., the principles of excluded middle for 0 1 -formulas hold. 17 ]. An inductive inference is a try-and-error algorithmic process to nd a r i g h t solution in nite time.
Here is an inductive inference for MNP. At the beginning, we temporarily assume that f(0) is the minimal value among f(0) f (1) : : : . Then, we start to compare the value of f (0) with the values f(1) f (2) : : : to con rm our hypothesis. If we n d f(n 1 ) smaller than f(0), then we c hange mind and assume that f(n 1 ) is the real minimal value instead. We repeat the process and continue to nd f(0) > f (n 1 ) > f (n 2 ) > : : : . Since the sequence is decreasing, we e v entually reach the minimal value f(n m ) in nite time. Then, we learned or discovered a right v alue for x.
Hilbert's main idea of the proof of the nite basis theorem in 10] was this argument on the learning process (see 7]). By applying the argument repeatedly to streams of algebraic forms, Hilbert gave a p r o o f of his famous lemma, which opened the door to the modern abstract algebra. By the aid of limiting realizability i n terpretation, it is not so di cult to read the learning process of a basis of any ideal of algebraic forms recursively enumerated, from his proof in 1890 paper.
Animation via games?
Execution of a proof in LCM is a kind of learning process as illustrated above. Using an analogy with learning processes, we can understand algorithmic contents of proofs of LCM rather intuitively. Nonetheless, it has not been known if such learning algorithms can be fully automatically extracted from formalized versions of such informal proofs.
According to our experiences with the PX system 6], algorithms which a r e automatically extracted from the proofs based on the mathematical soundness theorem or the original Curry-Howard isomorphism are much more complicated and illegible than the ones which h uman beings read from texts with realizability or Curry-Howard isomorphism in their minds. Human beings unconsciously re ne and simplify extracted codes. In the PX system, we i n troduced some optimization procedures to mimic humans' natural re nements and simpli cations. Natural codes could thus be extracted from proofs by the PX system.
We h a ve to do similar things to build an LCM animator, and it is a non-trivial technological task. Furthermore, there is a rather serious theoretical obstacle. In the algorithmic learning theory, an inductive inference is de ned by a limiting recursive function such a s f(x) = l i m n :g(n x), where g is a recursive function and n is a natural number. We compute g(0 x ) g (1 x ) : : : and, if it stops changing at g(n x), then the value g(n x) i s t h e v alue of the limit. Namely, the limit is \computed" through the discrete time line. Careful inspections of the sound-ness theorem in 15] shows that the learning processes extracted from proofs by the extraction method given there use a unique \global time" for the learning. However, Hilbert's proof in 10] apparently uses plural \local times". In a sense, a local time is generated by a occurrence of the principle of 0 1 -excluded middle. Since 0 1 -excluded middle is repeatedly used in Hilbert's proof, we h a ve several limits, each of which h a s i t s o wn internal clock in the learning algorithm associated to Hilbert's proof.
It is not di cult to read these learning algorithms based on plural \local times", when you look at Hilbert's original proof texts. 2 However, we do not have any formal way to represent such intuition yet. This has been the main obstacle to build a real proof animation tool based on LCM. However, recently, a game theoretic equivalent o f t h e i n terpretation has been found 3, 9], and we expect that it will give a r i g h t framework to solve this problem.
1-backtracking game
Game theoretical semantics of logical formulas are known to be a good substitute for Tarskian semantics of logic 13]. It is said that game semantics is easier to learn than Tarski semantics.
Coquand 5] introduced a game theoretical semantics of classical rst order arithmetic. It allows Eloise, the player for existential quanti ers, to do backtracking as she likes. On the other hand, her opponent Abelard, the player for universal quanti ers, is not allowed to backtrack. Due to backtracks, existence of recursive winning strategy for Eloise was proven to be equivalent t o t h e v alidity of the formula in Tarski's semantics. In standard games, e.g., 0 n -true sentences normally has a winning strategy at least of 0 n;1 . In this paper, Coquand's games will be referred to as backtracking games or full backtracking games. Since strategies are recursive, the backtracking game may be regarded as a way of executing classical logic.
It is known that this semantics still su ers global ilegibility, e v en though it is much more legible than the other constructivization of classical logic. However, when backtracks of the games are restricted to simple backtracks, the game semantics coincides with LCM semantics and become very legible. Such a g a m e is called 1-game or 1-backtracking game. We now g i v e i t s de nition. To d o so, we will de ne some game theoretic notions. His proof is the essentially the one of Dixon's lemma taught in the contemporary algebra courses. However, Hilbert's original proof is much more \learning theoretic" than the contemporary counterparts. Especially, the discussions in his course at G ottingen July 5th 1897 shows its learning theoretic nature 11]. moves alternatively. This restriction is not essential, and makes things easier. If the last move of a position is played by a player A, we say that A played the position. EndOfDef Let us note that the position of a play w as called \occurrence" in 5]. In our 9], the notion of position was more restrictive so that the end of a position must be played by Abelard. In the present paper, we relax the condition. Notations are di erent, but these two notions are essentially the same.
Position S 1 is a subposition of position S 2 i S 1 is an initial segment o f S 2 . Namely, S 1 is obtained from S 2 by \popping up" some rounds from the tail. 9x:T(e x) _ 8 a:T ; (e a): (2) It is transformed to the following prenex normal form: 9x:8a:((x > 0^T (e x ; 1)) _ (x = 0 T ; (e a))): (3) Eloise has the following recursive 1-backtracking strategy for it as shown below. Observe that there is only 1-backtracking. First, we de ne f() and g(y 1 ) without considering if they are 0 2 . After we de ned them, we will prove the de ned functions are 0 2 .
Let P( ) be the set of plays played after . Since all the plays of P( ) a r e played after , they must be nite. (In nite plays cannot be won in our game theoretical semantics.) Note that P( ) is a recursive set. There is a play p 0 in P( ) satisfying the following conditions: 1. The last position of p 0 is of the form x 1 = a 1 ]. Namely, it consists Eloise's move for the rst existential quanti er 9x 1 .
2. Let p 0 beu 0 : : : u n . I f u 0 : : : u n u n+1 : : : u m is an extension of p 0 in P( ), then u n+1 : : : u m never contains backtracking moves to 9x 1 . Namely, p 0 is a play \stable" with respect to 9x 1 . Beyond the last move o f t h e play, a n y m o ve p l a yed after never backtracks to 9x 1 anymore. Then, we de ne f() = a 1 , w h e r e x 1 = a 1 is the last move for a stable play p 0 . There might be many s t a b l e p l a ys. We m a y take the play smallest in some xed ordering.
We m ust prove such p 0 exists. It is proved by reductio ad absurdum. Consider the set S 1 of the plays in P( ) satisfying the rst condition for p 0 . Of course, it is not empty. Assume there is no plays satisfying the second condition in S 1 . Then, we can build an in nite play played after the strategy . L e t v 0 be any p l a y i n S 1 . Since this does not satisfy the second condition for p 0 , there is an extension v 1 whose last move i s a backtrack t o 9x 1 . It again belongs to S 1 . Repeatedly, we can de ne an in nite sequence v 1 v 2 : : : which is played after . T h us there is an in nite play p l a yed after . B u t , i t i s a c o n tradiction, since is a winning strategy.
Now w e v erify that f() is 0 2 -de nable. The rst condition for p 0 is a recursive statement and the second condition is 0 1 -statement. Thus, p 0 is de ned by a n e xpression min p0 P(p 0 ), where P is a 0 1 -formula expressing the two conditions for p 0 . S i n c e a n y 0 1 -predicates has 0 2 -characteristic functions, f() = min p0 P(p 0 ) is 0 2 -de nable.
After we de ned f(), we consider the games 9x 2 :8y 2 :R(f() b 1 x 2 y 2 ) for all b 1 , w h i c h are fought with after p 0 . More formally, w e consider the set P( ) " p 0 that is the set of all the play o f P( ), for which p 0 is an initial segment.
By essentially the same argument, we can de ne a \stable play" p b1 1 (y 1 ). There are recursive functions h(t) and k(t y 1 ) (guessing functions in the terminology of learning theory) such that f() = lim t h(t) a n d g(y 1 ) = lim t k(t y 1 ). Then, Eloise's winning strategy is as follows:
She plays for h(0) for 9x 1 , and, after Abelard's play b 1 for 8y 1 she plays k(0 b 1 ) for 9x 2 . If she wins for Abelard's play b 2 for 8y 2 , she stops. If she loses, she computes h(1). When h(1) changes from h(0), she backtracks to 9x 1 , and restart the play using h(1) and k(1 ;). When h(1) does not changes from h(0),i.e. h(0) = h(1), she backtracks to 9x 2 instead, and continue to play k(1 ;). Note that Abelard's rst play for 8y 1 is kept in the latter case, incrementing t of h(t) and k(t ;). Eventually, h(t) converges to f(). Assume h(t) is stable after t t 0 . She never backtracks to 9x 1 after t 0 , for h(t) does not change anymore after t 0 . Then, Abelard's play b 1 for 8y 1 is kept forever, since Eloise never backtracks beyond it. Eventually, k(t 0 b 1 ) c o n verges to g(b 1 ) and then she can win for any m o ve f o r 8y 2 . This ends the proof of if-direction.
General formulation of backtracking games and jump
The notion of 1-game has been further generalized and re ned by Berardi 3] .
We can associate a backtracking game bck(G) t o e a c h game G in the sense of set theory . In the setting of 3], both players are allowed to backtrack and winning conditions are de ned even for in nite plays. This is natural from the standard game theoretic point of view, unlike the game presented in this paper.
Remarkably, Berardi has proved that having a winning strategy for bck (G) in a degree O is equivalent to having a strategy for G in the jump O 0 . Thus, the motto is \1-backtracking represents the rst order quanti ers." We m a y s a y that, if we are allowed to change our hypotheses on a system (or on the nature), then we can cope with the \in nity" represented by arithmetical quanti ers.
Recall that Brouwer, Hilbert and their contemporaries in the research o f t h e foundations of mathematics in the 1920's regarded arithmetical quanti ers as the gate to the in nite world from the nite world. We m a y s a y the jump, namely a single arithmetical quanti er, corresponds to the \smallest in nity." Although nitary human beings are bound to be recursive, human beings may virtually handle the smallest in nity (or the jump) with try-and-error investigations or experiments, i.e. 1-backtracking. It strongly suggests that the learning theoretic notion of inductive inference would be a right kind of theoretical foundations of researches on the notion of discovery.
1-games and proof animation
Although there are some unsolved problems with the 1-game in applying it to proof animation, it seems to be the right framework for proof animation. In this subsection, we will discuss the problems of \approximation" and \semantics of implication."
In the limiting recursive realizability in 15], more the clock (the index n of lim n ) ticks, the closer the guesses get to the correct answer. Thus we can regard that learning algorithms are approximating the right a n s w er as time progresses. This simple notion of approximation is one of reasons why LCM-interpretation is legible than the other approaches.
In 1-games, there is no apparent notion of clocks. However, there is a kind of approximations. When Eloise picks, e.g. x = 7 for 9x:8y:A(x y), Abelard starts to attack her hypothesis x = 7 . H e m a y be able to give a c o u n terexample with a particular instance of y. Then, Eloise changes her hypothesis and continues to play. A s s h o wn in the proof of \only if"-part of the equivalence of the theorem above, Eloise eventually reaches a right solution for x. Namely, the more Abelard attacks Eloise's hypothesis, the close Eloise moves to the right a n s w er guided by her recursive winning strategy.
In other words, Eloise is approximating the right solution, pushed by test cases given by Abelard. Namely, the set of test cases (or attacks) by Abelard advances the clock. As the set grows, Eloise gets closer to the right answer. 3 To build a 1-game animator, we need a good notion of approximation formulated well. We have n o t found such a formulation on which a real software system can be built. We h a ve just started to analyze the real proofs by means of 1-games, seeking such a notion. The initial results show that it remarkably ts our intuitive understanding of the proofs mentioned above. This suggests that the 1-game is likely to be the right framework for proof animation. However, more case studies are necessary.
We n o w discuss the problem of semantics of implication. Note that we c o nsidered only the prenex normal forms for the 1-game. We did not handle implications. Transformation of an implicational formula to the prenex normal form already includes classical reasonings. we h a ve t o g i v e an game theoretical interpretation of implication which is equivalent to LCM-semantics of implication.
There are at least two w ays to handle implication in game theoretical seman- we m a y simulate recursive function calls by 1-backtracking. It is expected that this approach and subgame approach are related. However, from the system design point of view, these two are very di erent.
If we take the latter approach, the interaction between A and B becomes part of plays of the game and it would give more legible animation of proofs. However, we h a ve t o a l l o w Abelard to backtrack, since we m ust make the game symmetric to use the dual A ? of A. I f w e i d e n tify Abelard's moves as test cases as explained above, test cases with backtracks must be introduced. After these di erences, proof animation tools based on these two frameworks would be rather di erent.
3.5 Why is 1-game legible?
We will close this section by a remark on legibility of the 1-games. Since the full backtracking game needs only recursive strategies, there is no apparent reason to use the 1-game instead of the full backtracking game for proof animation. However, as already noted, the full backtracking game is not so legible as the 1-game. The ilegibility come from the lack of \stable play". If plays are stabilized, then the winning strategy is essentially that of 1-games. Thus, games won by stabilizing winning strategies must be 1-games. When, plays are not stabilized, we cannot \approximate" the truth. When, we say A _ B holds, we wish to know which o f A and B holds. In constructive mathematics, we can e ectively tell the answer. In LCM, we can approximate the truth. We m a y be wrong at the beginning, but we can move closer and closer to the right a n s w er by try-and-error processes. The temporary guesses may oscillate between A and B, b u t e v entually converge. In general, we cannot know w h e n i t c o n verges, but, for many concrete cases, we can often nd criteria by w h i c h w e can see when guesses are stabilized.
We never have such stabilization for plays of the 0 2 -excluded middle for the universal 0 2 -formula 9x:8y:T(e x y) _ 8 a:9b:T ; (e a b). A relatively simple winning strategy for this formula in t h e f u l l b a c ktracking game is given in 9]. However, the plays after it are never stabilized. Thus, we cannot have a n y useful information on which side of the disjunction operator holds, even though Abelard plays all possible moves. Contrary to this case, in the case of the 0 1 -excluded middle (2) above, when 9x:T(e x) is correct, we will observe a b a c ktracking and nd this side is correct. When 8a:T ; (e a) holds, we w i l l o b s e r v e the plays are stable and will have more and more con dence of the truth of 8a:T ; (e a), as the game is repeatedly played.
The 1-game is expected to be a restricted backtracking game. Namely, we have found a subset of the full backtracking games, in which Eloise's winning strategies are guaranteed \legible" in the sense that the plays are eventually stabilized. Note that this does not exclude the possibility o f s o m e p l a ys in Coquand's game beyond the 1-game may be legible in some particular cases. It is quite likely that there are some important classes of classical proofs beyond LCM, for which we can nd legible computational contents through the full backtracking game or the like.
Conclusion
We have brie y surveyed proof animation, limit computable mathematics and backtracking games. We presented a version of 1-backtracking game and give a detailed proof of its equivalence to limiting recursive realizability. We also discussed how these notions and some results are expected to be useful for proof animation. We are now analyzing some simple LCM-proofs such as a p r o o f of MNP from the 0 1 -excluded middle given in 9]. Doing so, we will eventually nd the right way to handle implication semantics and approximation. After nding the solutions, we w ould design and build a prototype of proof animator.
